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Résumé / Abstract
Nous présentons une expérience dans laquelle deux joueurs négocient avec
un troisième joueur. Les deux joueurs peuvent négocier séparément ou former une
coalition pour négocier collectivement avec le troisième. La solution théorique de
référence prédit des négociations décentralisées, car seulement un des joueurs a
intérêt à former une coalition. Les résultats de l'expérience montrent un nombre
significatif de négociations collectives. Lorsque comparée à la négociation
décentralisée, la négociation collective n'a pas d'effets significatifs sur les profits
des joueurs de la coalition, mais réduit le profit du troisième.
We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player.
They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively.
Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only
one player has an interest in forming a joint venture. However, we observe a
significant amount of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, when
compared with decentralized bargaining, has no significant effect on the payoffs
of the players in the joint venture but reduces the payoff of the third player.
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11. Introduction
One of the most basic decisions in human life is on whether to cooperate with others or to rely on
one’s own efforts only. An extreme form of cooperation is the foundation of a joint venture or, in
other words, the replacement of individual efforts by a common endeavor. We find such extreme
forms of cooperation as merger in industry, trade unions, political parties, and many other social
groups.
In this paper, we present an experiment in which we examine subjects' behavior in a situation
where they may either opt for a joint venture and bargain collectively or bargain individually with
a third party. Initiating and organizing a joint venture usually includes many different aspects.
The parties involved have, for example, to decide on who does what. This is an aspect which we
neglect in our experiment. We focus on the subjects' decisions for or against forming a joint
venture in a situation with an asymmetry known to all and on their bargaining strategies with and
without the joint venture. The specific purpose of the joint venture is to bargain with a third party
on a contract.
In a previous study (Berninghaus et al. 1998) a simple model of this joint venture problem is
introduced and both theoretically and experimentally investigated. There are two major results.
First, the theoretical solution predicts collective bargaining for some parameter combinations,
while it predicts decentralized bargaining for others. The experimental data, however, do not
reveal the predicted tendencies. Second, the theoretical solution predicts that, due to a basic
asymmetry, one of the potentially merging parties is stronger than the other. In some situations it
is better for the stronger party to vote against collective bargaining, while for the weaker party it
is always better to vote for collective bargaining. This finds expression in the experimental data in
that the weaker party votes for centralization more often than the stronger party.
The model of Berninghaus et al. (1998), similarly to the game-theoretical study by Selten and
Güth (1977), allows for only two possible contracts. This is a highly restrictive assumption which
we abandon in the present study. In our experiments, many contracts are possible. Furthermore, in
order to obtain a richer data set, we apply the strategy method of experimentation. We
simultaneously ask all subjects to give entire strategies for playing the game. A strategy
prescribes the bargaining decisions for both the case of collective and the case of decentralized
bargaining in addition to the decision for or against forming the joint venture (by its potential
partners).
The potentially merging parties could represent trade union representatives who decide on
whether they bargain collectively or individually on wages with the employers' representative.
The industrialized countries show large differences in wage bargaining structures. Wage
bargaining can take place at several different levels. At the extreme case of decentralization (as,
for example, in the United States and Canada), firms and employees negotiate over wages and
working conditions at the level of the individual establishment. At the other extreme of
centralized bargaining (as, for example, in the Scandinavian countries), national unions and
employers' associations may bargain for the whole country. At the intermediate level (as, for
2example, in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands), we may find sectoral, branch, or industry-
level bargaining.
In the macroeconometric literature there is an on-going debate about the impact of the degree of
centralization in wage bargaining on macroeconomic performance and, in particular, the wage
rates in a country (see OECD 1997 for a survey). Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that there is
a hump-shaped relationship. On theoretical and empirical grounds, they come to the conclusion
that both complete decentralization and complete centralization yield lower wage rates than
intermediate situations. But their result could not be replicated by, for example, Fitzenberger
(1995). Up to now, we have not encountered a satisfactory explanation of the impact of the
degree of centralization in wage bargaining on wage formation. The empirical studies face severe
measurement and methodological problems. Obviously, national wage bargaining systems show
differences other than those in the degree of centralization which also need to be taken into
account (see, for example, Traxler and Kittel 2001)
Our experiment may be considered an attempt to deal, in a somewhat abstract way, with some
aspects of the relationship between the degree of centralization in wage bargaining and the wage
rates. We focus on the question of which degree of centralization a trade union would actually
prefer if it could choose among various degrees of centralization and how this choice affects the
bargaining outcome. Our experiment is not designed, however, to test the hypothesis of a hump-
shaped relationship. We compare the cases of complete decentralization and complete
centralization; intermediate situations are not feasible with only two potentially merging parties.
A theoretical model dealing with the centralization question has also been presented by Horn and
Wolinsky (1988). Their model examines the centralization decision in an industry where a firm
employs two types of workers. The focus of the model is on potential gains from forming a joint
venture. Jun (1989) examines a similar model where the focus is on how the gains are allocated
among the members of the joint venture. Both models resemble ours in having a two-stage
structure where the two groups of workers decide in the first stage on whether or not to form a
joint venture. In contrast to our model, however, the second stage of their game relies on a non-
cooperative bargaining process similar to the one presented by Rubinstein (1982).
In the following Section 2 we introduce our model and analyze it (game-)theoretically. As in
Berninghaus et al. (1998), we use the (cooperative) bargaining solution introduced by Nash
(1950, 1953) to select a unique equilibrium. The experimental design, explained in Section 3,
concentrates on a parameter constellation in which only one of the potentially merging parties
should be interested in merging. In Section 4 we present a statistical analysis of the experimental
data. Section 5 concludes the article with a discussion of the major results.
32. The Model
In our experiments there are three players, X, Y, and Z. They can negotiate either in a
decentralized way or collectively. In the case of decentralized bargaining, X negotiates with Z
about the allocation of a "pie" PXZ  = 97, and, independently, Y negotiates with Z about the
allocation of a "pie" PYZ = 97. In case of collective bargaining, X and Y first merge into XY who
then bargains with Z about the allocation of the total "pie" PXYZ = 194. Whatever XY earns is
equally divided between X and Y.
Let i and j be the two bargaining parties; i.e., (i, j) is either (X, Z) or (Y, Z) or (XY, Z). Like
Berninghaus et al. (1998), we rely on a modified bargaining procedure of Nash (1950, 1953):
Each of the two parties k = i, j chooses a demand Dk and a bottom line Bk with Pij ≥ Dk ≥ Bk  ≥ Ck,
and where Ck  (≥ 0) denotes the conflict payoff of party k.
Given the vector (Di , Bi , Dj , Bj) of bargaining choices and the size of the "pie" Pij, a demand
agreement is reached if
Di + Dj  ≤ Pij
whereas a bottom line agreement is reached in the case of no demand agreement and
Bi  + Bj ≤ Pij
Whereas both parties k = i, j receive their demand Dk in case of a demand agreement, their profits
are determined by their bottom lines Bk in case of a bottom line agreement. If none of these two
agreements is achieved, the two parties end up in conflict with conflict payoffs Ck.
Since the conflict payoffs Ck depend on the pairing (i, j), we write Ck(i, j). We concentrate on the
following situation:
CX (X, Z) = 0 ,
CY (Y, Z) = b ,
CXY (XY, Z) = a + b,
CZ (X, Z) = c
CZ (Y, Z) = c
CZ (XY, Z) = 2c
with
a, b, c > 0 ;  b + c < 100 ;  a + c < 100
Due to the fact that CY (Y, Z) = b > 0 = CX (X, Z), we can say that Y is stronger than X.
To solve this game theoretically, we can consider the acceptance borders as the (only) essential
strategic variables. Obviously, in an efficient equilibrium the bargaining parties must choose
4Bi + Bj = Pij
To select a unique efficient equilibrium outcome as a benchmark solution we rely on the Nash
bargaining solution, which maximizes the product of the dividends (Bk – Ck) for k = i, j.
For the pair (i, j) = (X, Z) we maximize (BX – 0) (BZ – c) subject to BX + BZ = 97. This yields
B*X = 48.5 – c/2, and B*Z = 48.5 + c/2
For the pair (i, j) = (Y, Z) we maximize (BY – b) (BZ – c) subject to BY + BZ = 97. This yields
B*Y = 48.5 + (b – c)/2, and B*Z = 48.5 + (c – b)/2
For the pair (i, j) = (XY, Z) we maximize (BXY – a – b) (BZ – 2c) subject to BXY + BZ = 194. This
yields
B*XY  = 97 + (a + b – 2c)/2, and B*Z = 97 + (2c – a – b)/2
Recall that the payoff BXY, or the conflict payoff (a + b) are to be divided equally between X and
Y. Because a + b > 0 it follows that B*XY /2 > B*X. Thus, the weaker party X has an interest in
forming XY.
In this experimental study, we will consider a situation where the stronger party Y has no interest
in forming XY. The condition B*Y > B*XY/2 has to be satisfied. Given, our parameter constraints,
this implies b > a.
The actually chosen parameters are
a = 12,  b = 24,  c = 11
Table 1 shows the resulting solution payoffs for X, Y, and Z under collective and decentralized
bargaining. In the bottom row we have determined each player’s incentives for centralizing as the
difference of his payoff in the case of collective bargaining and his payoff in the case of
decentralized bargaining. Obviously, of the three players only X has positive incentives for
centralizing. Our benchmark solution, thus, predicts decentralized bargaining.
5Table 1: Payoffs for players X, Y, and Z under collective
and decentralized bargaining, and each player’s incentives for centralizing
X Y Z
decentralized bargaining 43 55  96a
collective bargaining 52 52 90
incentives for centralizing 9 -3 -6
a
 54 + 42
3. Experimental Design
The experiments were organized at the University of Karlsruhe with students from various
faculties. Each subject was seated at a computer terminal. The experiment monitor distributed
written instructions and read them aloud. Then each subject had to answer at his terminal a
number of questions which tested the understanding of the instructions. Only when all subjects
had correctly answered all questions could the experiment start. Subjects were not allowed to
communicate other than through their decision making.
Each subject was randomly allocated the role of either player X, Y, or Z. Each subject participated
in 20 negotiation rounds keeping the same role. The matchings of an X, a Y, and a Z player,
however, were randomly determined in each round within matching groups of 9 players (3 players
in each role). The subjects had complete information about the game, but they were not informed
about the size of the matching group. In each round, all subjects made their decisions
simultaneously and independently. These decisions represented complete plans prescribing
decisions for all situations that might occur in that round.
The X and Y players had to declare whether they wanted to bargain collectively or not.
Furthermore they had to choose an integer demand and acceptance border for individual and for
collective bargaining. Similarly, the Z player had to choose an integer demand and acceptance
border both for the individual negotiations with X and with Y, in case X and/or Y wanted to
negotiate separately, and for the negotiation with XY, in case both X and Y wanted to negotiate
collectively. When all players had made their decisions, it was determined whether decentralized
or collective bargaining would take place and the appropriate negotiation was effectuated. For
collective bargaining to take place, both X and Y had to vote for it. If only one of them opted for
merging, decentralized bargaining took place. In the case of collective bargaining, it was
randomly decided which of the two players, X or Y, was representing them in the negotiation with
Z. At the end of each round, each player was informed whether decentralized or collective
bargaining had taken place and about his own individual payoff and the payoff of the party he was
negotiating with.
6We organized 8 sessions with 18 subjects, i.e., two matching groups, each. Thus, we obtained 16
independent observations (matching groups) in total. At the end of each session, each subject was
privately paid in cash his accumulated payoff for the 20 rounds. The conversion rate was 3
pfennigs (0.03 deutsche mark, DM) for 1 experimental currency unit. The average payment was
DM 24.88 for the subjects in the role of player X, DM 26.12 for those in the role of player Y and
DM 47.19 for those in the role of player Z.
4. Experimental results
4.1 Collective or decentralized bargaining
Recall that theoretically the X player has an interest in collective bargaining while the Y player
should prefer decentralized bargaining. As collective bargaining can take place only if both X and
Y vote for it, the solution predicts decentralized bargaining. We observe, however, that (in the
aggregate over all matching groups and rounds) 40 percent of all bargaining is collective. Fig. 1
shows the percentage of collective bargaining in each of the 20 rounds. The percentage of
collective bargaining declines from 41 percent in the first 10 rounds to 39 percent in the second
10 rounds, but this decline is statistically insignificant (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5
percent level). Of the X players’ votes, 77 percent are for collective bargaining while of the Y
players’ votes, 51 percent are for collective bargaining. Thus, similar to Berninghaus et al. (1998),
we find evidence in favor of the prediction in that the X players vote significantly more often for
collective bargaining than the Y players (two-sided sign test, 1 percent significance level).
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Fig. 1: Percent of collective bargaining in each of the 20 rounds
74.2 Bargaining behavior
Table 2 presents the average demands and bottom lines of players X and Y both in decentralized
and in collective bargaining. It also presents the average demands and bottom lines of the Z
players in negotiation with X, Y, and XY. We observe that all demands are significantly higher
than the respective bottom lines (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent level). In other
words, all player types in all situations tend to make concessions in that their bottom lines  are
below their demands. We observe no significant differences between the demands (or bottom
lines) of X (or Y) players in decentralized and in collective bargaining. Neither do we observe
significant differences between the demands (or bottom lines) of X players and Y players1. The Z
players’ demands show no significant differences whether they bargain with X, Y, or XY. The Z
players’ bottom lines, however, do significantly differ: their bottom lines in the negotiation with X
are higher than those in the negotiation with Y, and their bottom lines in the negotiation with Y
are higher than their bottom lines per player (i.e., half of their bottom lines) in the negotiation
with XY (two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent level). In other words, the Z players
perceive the Y players to be stronger than the X players, but they perceive the joint venture XY to
be even stronger than the two parties separately. These differences show in the bottom lines rather
than in the demands suggesting that bottom lines are behaviorally more relevant than demands .
Table 3 splits the demands and bottom lines of players X and Y according to whether the
respective player voted for decentralized or for collective bargaining. We make the following
observations (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests, 5 percent level): X players who vote for
collective bargaining demand significantly more than X players who vote for decentralized
bargaining2. Y players who vote for collective bargaining demand in the collective bargaining
mode significantly more than Y players who vote for decentralized bargaining. This is also true
for the bottom lines. We conclude that X players who vote for collective bargaining think that
they should try to achieve more in decentralized bargaining as well. Y players who are willing to
bargain collectively try to do better in collective bargaining than Y players who are not willing to
bargain collectively3.
Comparing demands and bottom lines (as presented in Table 2) to our benchmark solution (in
Table 1), we observe the following (one-sided binomial tests, 5 percent level): In the case of
decentralized bargaining, X players’ demands and bottom lines and Z players’ demands and
bottom lines in  negotiation with Y tend to be too high while Y players’ bottom lines and Z players’
demands and bottom lines in negotiation with X tend to be too low. In the case of collective
bargaining, X and Y players’ bottom lines are significantly too low, while Z players’ demands are
too high. Generally the bargaining behavior of the different players does not seem to reflect the
strength that our benchmark solution attributes to them.
                                                          
1
 Note, however, that in decentralized bargaining the Y players’ demand just fails significance for being higher than
the X players’ demand by p = 0.058.
2
 This is true for their demand as X; it just fails significance for their demand as XY (p=0.051).
3
 Note, however, that we do not know how seriously subjects considered the demands and acceptance borders for
collective bargaining in situations where due to their own vote collective bargaining could not happen.
8Demands and bottom lines are rather closely located around the equal split of the total "pie", i.e.,
48.5. While the demands of the X, Y, and Z players, in decentralized and collective bargaining,
significantly tend to be above half of the "pie", bottom lines significantly tend to be below half of
the "pie" (one-sided binomial test, 5 percent level)—with the exception, however, of the Y
players' demands and bottom lines (as the XY representative) in collective bargaining. Recall that
according to our benchmark solution, the Y player's bottom line in decentralized bargaining, the
XY player's bottom line, and the Z player's bottom line in the negotiation with X should be larger
than half of the "pie".
Let us define a player's concession as the difference of his demand and bottom line. Table 4
presents the average concessions of X, Y, and Z players in decentralized and collective bargaining.
In the case of collective bargaining we consider half of the concession, or the concession per
player in XY. We observe no significant difference between the concessions of players X and Y
and between decentralized and collective bargaining. Furthermore, we observe no significant
differences between the concession of player Z and players X or/and Y. We observe, however,
significantly higher concessions of Z players in collective bargaining than in decentralized
bargaining (two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 1 percent level). We may interpret this as
further evidence that Z players perceive the joint venture XY as a stronger bargaining partner than
either X or Y separately.
Table 2: Average demands and bottom lines
player X player Y player Z
X XYa Y XYa X Y XYa
demand
bottom
52.81
45.88
52.90
46.52
54.76
46.62
51.73
44.74
51.68
46.41
50.92
45.63
51.07
43.59
a
 per player
Table 3: Average demands and bottom lines of the X and Y players
in voting against/for centralization
vote against centralization vote for centralization
player X player Y player X player Y
X XYa Y XYa X XYa Y XYa
demand
bottom
51.10
45.79
50.27
43.62
53.53
46.87
46.53
39.70
53.22
45.51
53.84
47.24
56.49
46.08
56.73
48.83
a
 per player
9Table 4: Average concessions
player X player Y player Z
toward X toward Y toward XY
decentralized
collectivea
6.93
6.38
8.14
6.98
5.27 5.29
7.48
a
 per player
4.3 Agreements and conflicts
The relative frequency of demand agreements is 27.60 percent in decentralized bargaining and
28.13 percent in collective bargaining. The relative frequency of bottom line agreements is 60.76
percent in decentralized bargaining and 49.22 percent in collective bargaining. The relative
frequency of conflicts is 11.63 percent in decentralized bargaining and 22.66 percent in collective
bargaining. Table 5 shows the respective percentages separately for the bargaining situation
between X and Z and between Y and Z. There appears to be no difference between them. In
decentralized bargaining, border agreements become significantly more frequent from the first 10
rounds to the second 10 rounds. In all cases, border agreements occur more often than demand
agreements and conflicts. Thus, acceptance borders are behaviorally more relevant than demands.
Table 5: Relative frequency of demand agreements, bottom line agreements and conflicts
demand
agreement
bottom
agreement
conflict
collective
decentralized
XY–Z
X–Z
Y–Z
28.13
27.78
27.43
49.22
  60.76a
  60.76a
22.66
11.46
11.81
a
 Significantly increased from the first 10 rounds to the second 10 rounds (Wilcoxon matched pair
signed rank test, 5 percent significance level, two-sided)
4.4 Payoffs
The average payoffs per period realized by the X, Y, and Z players are 41.46, 43.53, and 78.65
respectively. Although the Y players on average gain significantly more than the X players (one-
sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent level), Y players gain only 79.1 percent of their
theoretically predicted profit under decentralized bargaining while X players gain 96.4 percent of
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the predicted profit. Z players gain 82.8 percent of the predicted payoff and significantly less than
the sum of the X and Y players’ profits (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test, 5 percent level).
Table 6 presents both the predicted and the average realized payoffs per round of each bargaining
party in decentralized and collective bargaining. For the realized payoffs we determine the X, Y,
and Z players’ incentives for centralizing as the differences of payoff in collective bargaining and
the payoff in decentralized bargaining. The incentives are 1.04, -2.40, and -14.83 for the X, Y, and
Z player respectively. Thus, compared to the theoretical benchmark solution, the X players’
incentive and the Y players’ disincentive have become less important while the Z players
disincentive has become more important.
We find significance for the following observations (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test; 5
percent level; all other comparisons show no significant difference): (1) The Z players’ payoffs
per XY player in collective bargaining tend to be lower than their payoffs in the negotiation with X
alone (a) or Y alone (b). Thus, the Z players’ total payoffs in collective bargaining tend to be
lower than their sum of payoffs in decentralized bargaining. (2) In collective bargaining, the Z
players’ payoffs per XY player tend to be lower than those of the X players and those of the Y
players. (3) In decentralized bargaining, the Z players’ payoffs tend to be lower than those of the Y
players but higher than those of the X players. (4) The Y players’ payoffs in decentralized
bargaining just fail significance for being larger than their payoffs in collective bargaining4 and
larger than the X players’ payoffs5. Of these observations only (1b) violates the prediction of the
Nash bargaining solution.
Table 6: The predicted and average realized payoffs per round in decentralized and
collective bargaining (the realized payoffs include those in case of conflict)
negotiation parties
(i, j) payoff of party i payoff of party j
Nash bargaining
prediction
(X, Z)
(Y, Z)
(XY, Z)
43
55
  52*
54
42
  45*
realized payoff
per round
(X, Z)
(Y, Z)
(XY, Z)
41.04
44.49
  42.09*
42.73
41.85
  34.88*
* per player of party i
                                                          
4
 Actually, p=0.051.
5
 Actually, p=0.051.
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5. Conclusion
We observe that in 40 percent of the cases the stronger Y players vote for collective bargaining
although it is not in their strategic interest: not only according to the theoretical benchmark
solution but also in the experiment (although this just fails significance) Y players do, on average,
gain higher payoffs in decentralized than in collective bargaining. We suggest that the larger
number of votes for collective bargaining by Y players might be influenced by an inequality
aversion with respect to the Z players (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 1999). In
collective bargaining, Z players claim less than in decentralized bargaining. Thus, in collective
bargaining Z players gain significantly lower payoffs than in decentralized bargaining—their
payoffs in collective bargaining still being higher than those of the X or Y players, though.
Demands and bottom lines are located around the equal split of the total "pie." Obviously,
fairness considerations similar to those observed in ultimatum bargaining experiments also play
some part in our experiment (see Roth 1995 for a survey).
X (and Y) players who vote for collective bargaining claim (in collective bargaining) a larger
share of the pie for themselves than those who vote for decentralized bargaining. This supports
the common claim that by forming a coalition a bargaining side may gain in strength (Einigkeit
macht stark!). According to game theory this claim is true only for specific (parameter)
constellations different from the one we use (see Berninghaus et al. 1998). For our particular
model, the benchmark solution predicts a minor loss for Z when X and Y merge (-6). In the
experiment, we observe a loss which is more than twice as great (-14.83).
Our experiment may be considered another test of the Nash bargaining solution. Nydegger and
Owen (1975) and Roth and Malouf (1979) have presented experiments designed to test the
axioms of the Nash bargaining solution. Keser, Rullière and Villeval (1999) also explore the
predictive success of the Nash bargaining solution in an experiment where employers bargain
with trade unions of different sizes. They observe that employers do not adapt their claims to the
union's size as predicted by the Nash bargaining solution. Our experiment allows us, like
Berninghaus et al. (1998), to compare the success of the Nash bargaining prediction in
decentralized and collective bargaining. We observe that the behavior of Z players qualitatively
reflects the strength relation between X and Y in the case of decentralized bargaining. However, in
the case of collective bargaining, the strength of the joint venture is overvalued. One possible
explanation is an "irrational" fear of Z players regarding the joint venture (supported by the fact
that Z players claim less from XY than they claim from X and Y separately). A more convincing
explanation is offered by the Einigkeit macht stark result discussed above. If Z has to bargain
with XY instead of X and Y separately, both partners of the XY joint venture have voted for it.
According to Table 3, those who vote for XY have higher aspirations than the average X or Y
participant. Thus, voting for the joint venture can be seen as the determined self-selection of
tough bargainers. In other words, when XY forms, Z confronts tougher bargaining partners than
when XY does not form. This also explains the higher conflict rate in collective bargaining than in
decentralized bargaining.
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